Essays zu Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo, Religion
The text "Faith and Knowledge" of Derrida in *Religion* (1996) consists of two parts: Italics and a Post-scriptum with 52 crypts, 'dispersed in a non-identified field' (40). 'Italics' obviously refers to the Italian context: the island Capri where the debate with Vattimo and Gadamer took place. But to what does the Post-scriptum refer? Is Derrida reaching out beyond the Scripture, deconstructing the Biblical foundation of the three monotheistic religions: Christianity, Islam and Judaism? Yes, but he goes some steps further. In "Post-Scriptum: Aporias, Ways and Voices" (1991) Derrida has also thrown some light on this enigmatic post-scriptum. It seems that the 'post' implies a radical gesture. It is not that Derrida is trying to get beyond 'écriture' - post-scriptum is at most a hors-d’œuvre as a parergon -, he is directing our attention to a non-deconstructible 'foundation' of human socio-political relations as he did in *Force de loi* (1990), *Spectres de Marx* (1993) and *Politiques de l’amitié* (1994) in exploring the originary violence within justice.

I think Derrida pinpoints his specific domain of interest in *Religion* in two sentences of his text. One almost at the beginning and the other as the paenultima: "Whence the aporia - a certain absence of way, path, issue, salvation -- and the two sources" (2) and "it makes way, perhaps, but with the slightest generosity," (66). Motivated by an aporia both Reason and Religion open a way, "neither divine nor human" (66). Responding to the question as to what this aporia may be, to my opinion an exploration of it in terms of the notion of 'chora' and 'différence' is needed. I begin with Derrida's transformation of aporia from an epistemological configuration to an experiential dynamics with an abyssal quality. 3

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* The ideas expressed in this article are developed within the Research Group 'Spirituality' of the Dutch-Flemish Association for Intercultural Philosophy (NVVIF) at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. See: http://come.to/interculturality.
3 This is comparable with my critique on Lyotard's transformation of the 'sublime' in 'aisthesis'. See for this critique: "Inter-esse, inter-mediality and trans-formance.
With the topic of Derrida’s text in mind – religio – I explore the explanatory power of this experiential aporia for understanding his appreciation of negative theology and mysticism.

In connecting Christian belief and ‘tele-techno-scientific capitalism’ in the configuration of ‘globalatinization’ Derrida’s philosophy is actualized more than ever. Nevertheless I think his ‘écriture’ is not adequate enough to diagnose a specific dimension of faith in our age, in which Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is the determining force: of politico-economic processes and of relations between, on the one hand, the local and the global, on the other the virtual and the actual. Both tensional fields are constitutive for daily transactions and interactions of individuals and groups. In order to understand the specific quality of these relations I will introduce two neologisms to further elucidate these within network society: ‘infotom’ as the ‘specter’ of the atom – and ‘informe’ as a resistance to an all-over informatization. This opens a peculiar theological perspective: not a negative theology, nor even a ‘theiology’ (60) but an ICTology. Using these notions I desacralize – but in no way secularize or laicize (65) – Derrida’s, to my opinion still ‘sublime’ use of chora and différance. Within ‘a certain ‘atheism’’ (65) I translate Derrida’s ‘spacing’ and ‘linking’ by rephrasing his remarks on the aporetical dynamics of a ‘social bond’ in terms of a desacralized ‘religio’ that is more affirmative and transversal and less negative and hierarchal: the esse of the in between or inter-esse.

Derrida’s project is situated within the field a philosophy of differences, that is also elaborated by Foucault, Lyotard, Kristeva, Irigaray and Deleuze. In particular I aim at a philosophical crossbreeding of Derrida’s and Deleuze’s philosophical enterprises. This is not a forced allogamy. One biographical remark will suffice to elucidate this. While Derrida was preparing his text after the conference on Capri in 1994 his friend and colleague Gilles Deleuze decided to end his life as a result of fatal complications of his physical condition. The last text Deleuze wrote before his death is titled: “L’immanence: une vie...”5. In a short text, written after Deleuze’s death in 1995 Derrida states: “I will continue to begin again to read Gilles Deleuze in order to learn”. Would Deleuze still have lived, Derrida would have posed him some questions about “his (Deleuze’s, HO)


interpretation of (...) the word ‘immanence’ on which he always insisted, in order to make him or let him say something that no doubt still remains secret to us”.

Of course there has always been a strong resonance between both philosophies: repetition or iterability – the ‘re’ of return and religion – are two parallel trajectories. When Deleuze in *Difference and Répétition* (1968) writes about the ‘differenciator of difference’ doubtlessly he has at the back of his mind Derrida’s ‘différance’. Against this background, reading Derrida’s text on religion, one cannot escape the impression that his analysis is more Deleuzian than ever: his approach of teletechnocapitalism, the insistent use of the machinic notions – ‘answering machine’ (65), ‘tele machine’ (42), ‘discursive machine’ (35) – and the typical Deleuzian dynamics of ‘de-’ and ‘re-’. Highly instructive is Derrida’s reference (41) to one of Deleuze’s main inspirations: Henri Bergson’s *The Two Sources of Morality and of Religion* (1932), that Deleuze kept reading after having written *Le Bergsonisme* in 1966: “And as in the case of obligation, each god is contingent, or even absurd, but what is natural, necessary and grounded is having gods; it is the pantheon of gods”.

As a result of this crossbreeding Derrida’s experiential aporia pops up in the middle of now/here as a core dynamics of an ontology of the in-between: the ‘esse’ of an inter - inter-esse – as the abyssal foundation of a life. Against this transformation, crucial Derridean remarks like “internal splitting, which opens distance” (46) or: we have to “respect the distance of infinite alterity as singularity” (22) get a pressing meaning: mutual respect calls an in between into being with a ‘choraic’ quality. In decrypting, earthing and desacralizing Derrida’s chora with ICTological notions of infotom and informe and singularizing chora in the very mundane notion of ‘interesse’, to my opinion Derrida’s ‘religio’ is updated en enriched.

1. Aporia

In an informational global society media publicity and political transparency are high priorities. The problems, risen around the election of the American president in November 2000 has once more shown that this can lead to a highly paradoxical situation, triggering disturbing experiences and undermining civil society and its laws: democracy is problematized by democratic procedures. Derrida, though “having an unreserved taste (...) to the res publica, to ‘public-ness’” (8) is not us-

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6 See: http://www.use.edu/dept/comp-lit/tympanum/1/derrida1.html
ing the word ‘publicity’. He speaks about ‘revealibility’ in order to direct our minds to the possibility for something - yet un(in)formed - to announce itself beyond politics, yet within politics. Not as a revelation, but nevertheless as a force that resists all discursive anticipations, yet focusing us on an event to come: avenir. This deconstructed messianism is as a ‘messianic’ “a general structure of experience”(18). But what kind of experience is this?

In Religion this experience is intrinsically connected with aporia and chora. Derrida’s deconstruction of Aristotle’s aporia and Plato’s chora starts at the end of the sixties and culminates in his lecture in Cerisy-la-Salle in 1992. In Force of Law, The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’ (1990) this deconstruction is politicized. This politics is further globalized and actualized in L’autre cap (1991) and Spectres de Marx (1993). In the context of Benjamin’s redefinition of the violence in Force of Law the problem of justice is qualified as “an experience of the impossible”. The problems we encounter in trying to get a grip on justice are not infi nite because of their quantity - it is not about jurisprudence as law in action - not even because they are enveloped within the infinite memories of cultures. The problems are infinite, “because they require the very experience of aporia that is not unrelated to what I just called the ‘mystical’”8. Before we can understand Derrida’s use of ‘mystical’ we fi rst have to explore his aporia-notion.

a. epistemological configuration

Revealibility, politics, justice, mystical. These notions are related to what Derrida calls an aporia in Religion. In his early texts references to aporetical arguments are sporadic and if systematic, critical. In these contexts aporia marks an untenable epistemological position: the conclusions, drawn from a coherent system of knowledge, undermine the very presuppositions of it. A discursive system becomes aporetical once it blows up its own foundation, opening an abyss within itself. Derrida subscribes Husserl’s critique on the aporetical structure of Kant’s Ideas. He criticizes Freud for his aporetical position taken in his metapsychological works due to his positivist intentions. Aporia is a contradiction inherent in reasoning.

Derrida starts deconstructing the oppositional structure of western metaphysics. In La dissémination (1972) – ‘La pharmacie de Platon’ – oppositions are situated against the background of Plato’s ‘chora’: “the transgression of all oppositions of ‘platonism’ towards the aporia of the originary inscription...”9. In the

same year Derrida publishes *Marges de la Philosophie* (1972) containing the essay ‘La Différence’, but also ‘Ousia et Grammè’, in which he explicitly thematizes the aporia. Time and again he refers to these crucial texts. In ‘Ousia et Grammè’ the discursive history of the ontology of the ‘now’ is traced. Starting with a critique on Heidegger’s remarks on Hegel’s paraphrase of the Aristotelian treatment of the ‘now’ as the impossible in-between of the past and future Derrida deconstructs this ‘vulgar concept’ of time.

Here ‘aporia’ is still treated in a pejorative sense: “D’une certaine manière on pourra dire que la dialectique ne fait toujours que répéter l’aporie exotérique en l’affirmant, en faisant du temps l’affirmation de l’aporétique”\(^\text{10}\). Derrida nevertheless acknowledges that one can only reflect upon the aporia in an exoteric way like Aristotle did. His objection to Aristotle is that he “repeats the aporia without deconstructing it”\(^\text{11}\). Though for Derrida repetition is the main option for understanding how meaning is produced, this ‘iterability’ of the vulgar aporia must imply a deconstructed return. When something returns, its very exposition undermines and constitutes - de/constructs - its former meaning. The return of religion is motivated by the same dynamics.

In Derrida’s writings after 1986 concerning ethical and aesthetic issues, the epistemological aporia is revalued. Although *De l’esprit. Heidegger et la question* (1987) only contains two general remarks on the ‘aporetical of Heidegger’, in *Schibboleth. Pour Paul Celan* (1986) the aporia was already approached in a more affirmative sense. Taking Celan’s poem ‘Schibboleth’ as a starting point, Derrida rephrases the Hegelian problematic of the general and the particular in terms of the singular: this cannot be understood as a subspecies of a general law or rule. In order not to fall into the trap of the dialectics – every negation is already part of the dialectical dynamics - Derrida uses for this non-relation the notion ‘aporia’, circumscribing it in terms of difference and multiplicity: “Non, je me limiterai à l’aporie (au passage barré, no pasarán: ce que veut dire aporie). Ce qui semble barrer le passage de la traduction, c’est la multiplicité des langues dans le même poème, en une seule fois”.\(^\text{12}\) "Schibboleth", Derrida states, "marque la multiplicité dans la langue, la différence insignifiante comme condition du sens"\(^\text{13}\).

From an institutional perspective reading a poem is different from reading a philosophical text. But to Derrida the deconstructive experience of poetry is also embedded in an ‘écriture’, precisely as a result of the aporetical ‘structure’ of its


\(^{11}\) *Marges*. o.c., p. 57.


\(^{13}\) *Schibboleth*. o.c., p. 54.
discursivity. The aporia is neither a Kantian antinomy, nor a Hegelian contradiction, nor a paradox. As paradox it would still function within a non-enlightened language perspective, the antinomy is still caught up within the foundational discourse of consciousness as the double binding of two exclusive laws and in the contradiction reason plays with its non-discursive counterpart in order to incorporate it. If we want to understand Derrida’s notion of an aporetical ‘experience’ as the experiential core of ‘a return of religion’ we have to leave Kant behind and turn to Heidegger: ‘er-fahren’ as experientia is reanimated in Derrida’s aporia as a traversing without any orientation or meaning, i.e. sense. But it is not Heidegger’s notion of the ‘ontological difference’ that constitutes this experience. Derrida aims at a ‘more ancient’ difference that goes beyond Heidegger’s perspective: difféance.

If an experience is defined as “a traversal, something that traverses and travels towards a destination for which it finds an appropriate passage”, then “in this sense it is impossible to have a full experience of aporia”14. Aporia denies this ‘traversal’ quality. Derrida stresses the tensional forces within the aporia by articulating this specific ‘experience’ as one of necessity and impossibility. In Religion this leads to typical Derridean formulations. Speaking about the two sources of religion — trustworthiness and the unsathedness of the unsathed — in a very complex way he directs our minds to the fact that every critique on the specific historical conditions of institutionalized forms of religion nevertheless affirms the possibility of both sources: “But it seems impossible to deny the possibility in whose name — thanks to which — the derived necessity (the authority or determinate belief) would be put in question, suspended, rejected or criticized, even deconstructed”(59). In an experiential perspective necessity and impossibility converge in the experience of inevitability: ‘il faut’ in Derrida’s vocabulary.

b. experiential dynamics

After 1987 the experiential dimension of aporia gains importance. Donner le temps. La fausse monnaie (1991) explores this experience in a deconstruction of the gift: A gift presupposes a non calculable relation. With Bataille’s distinction of a general and restricted economy in mind15 Derrida situates the gift in between the general and the restricted economy: the gift constitutes a relation by non relating in its excessive dissipation. The same goes for the decision. In “Postscriptum: Aporias, Ways and Voices” (1991) he states: "Would there be a way (voie/poreia, ho) without the necessity of deciding there where the decision

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14 Force of Law, o.c., p. 947.
seems impossible? Would there be a decision there where the decision is possible and programmable?"16. One cannot decide to take a decision. In deciding the subject opens the future as the event to come (avenir), that may be (peut-être) a total conversion. The subject chooses against itself, not because it wants to, but because it is forced to: il faut. This ‘il faut’ stresses the inevitability that also implies a lack: a negativity, an impossibility. In a psychological translation perhaps the originary force that makes one decide, is the pathos that Kant ‘transcendentalized’ and put into a reception-aesthetic perspective in his analysis of the experience of the Sublime in *Kritik der Urteilskraft*.

In 1992 - in his inaugural lecture *Aporias. Dying – awaiting (one another at) the ‘limits of truth’* delivered at the symposium in Cerisy-la-Salle that was dedicated to his writings – Derrida reinterprets retrospectively his complete oeuvre in terms of the aporia. Aporia finally has become ‘an interminable experience’ and deconstruction “a certain aporetic experience of the impossible”17. As to the ‘schibboleth-effect’, this "always exceeds meaning and the pure discursivity of meaning". It reveals the other in the self: "the stranger at home". The subtitle has a messianic quality: as with the gift and the decision their can be neither calculation nor expectation. But this does not imply that what arrives comes out of the blue. There is ‘no to-come without some sort of iterability (...) without some sort of messianic memory and promise, of a messianicity older than all religion, more originary than all messianism’(47). As a result of a heterogenesis an ethico-political ‘hospitality’ enters Derrida’s philosophical stage. What is hosted, however, is first and for all this aporia: the expectation of something or someone to arrive or to return. What will happen or who/what arrives however is unpredictable.

Mixing etymologies of ‘religio’ - ‘relegere’ (return to ‘logos’) and ‘religare’ (establishing a new bond) - Derrida rephrases the two sources of ‘religio’ in experiential terms. There is a double experience in religiosité: ‘an experience of belief’ and ‘one of the unscathed, of sacredness or of holiness’(33). In deconstructing Aristoteles’ vulgar time notion, aporia now has become “the general structure of experience”(30). All experiences Derrida thematizes in *Religion* stand out against this aporia: ‘experience of witnessing’(63), ‘miraculous experience’(64) and ‘experience of faith’(64). Faith as performative brings people together: “Without the performative experience of this elementary act of faith, there would neither be a ‘social bond’ nor address to the other…”(44). In these experiences Derrida singularizes messianism of the monotheistic religions: as messianic on a ‘microrelig-

16 *Derrida and Negative Theology*, o.c., p. 320.
ious’ level it becomes a ‘mystical’ event that constitutes every promise, oath or pledge. Every pledge - gage - retrospectively presupposes an authority. So this literal ‘engagement’ presupposes a double binding: “Production and reproduction of the unproducible absent in place. Everything begins with the presence of that absence”(27). Every promise presupposes an act of faith of the addressee that makes the sender trustworthy. Eventually the performative practice of both participants is a “nameable-unnameable, present-absent witness of every oath or of every possible pledge”(27). If the legitimization of a pledge or promise is produced in the act of promising - “the promise promises itself”(30) - then intentionality of both participants is not primary. If the subject is the final authority then “the unengenderable thus engendered is the empty place”(27). When the subject took over the authority of the dead God, his assumption of power was nothing but a salto mortale in an already ‘existing’ abyss: the promise presupposes ‘will and freedom’, but ‘without autonomy’(34).

As an abyss of receiving18 – being ready for any ‘arrivant’ and ‘revenant’19 - Derrida has redefined the platonic chora in terms of an aporetical site. To me this makes his circumcision of chora in Religion comprehensible as “the name for place, a place name, and a rather singular one that, for that spacing which, not allowing itself to be dominated by any theological, ontological and anthropological instance, is without age, without history”. Yet chora “does not even announce itself as ‘beyond being’ in accordance with a path of negation, a via negativa”(20).

2. Negative theology and mysticism

In Religion Derrida phrases chora exactly the same way as he circumscribes difference in Marges in 1972: “beyond all oppositions, i.e. sensible/intelligible (...), more ‘ancient’ than all oppositions”(20)20. But in relation to the difference Derrida rejects any alliance with negative theology, that during this phase of his philosophy still presupposes a ‘superessentiality’. As a result of the transformation of the aporia from ‘Ousia et Gramme’ up to ‘Schibboleth’ however, he revalues his position towards negative theology. In ‘How to avoid speaking: Denials’ (1987) the via negativa is no longer rejected, but specified: it is “not a proof of the existence of God, but a proof of God by His effects, (...) by effects without

18 Aporias, o.c., p. 10.
20 Margins, o.c., p. 17/26.
cause, the \textit{without cause}”. Using this retrospective binding strategy to counter-attack his critics, he redefines negative theology as “a certain typical attitude towards language, and within it, in the act of definition or attribution, an attitude towards semantic or conceptual determination”. In a repetitive performativity, speaking negatively about the effects we engender the absence of God.

More instructive than this deconstructive move towards negative theology is Derrida’s positive evaluation of the ‘mystical’. A mystical is, as stated in \textit{Force of Law}, ‘not unrelated’ to an experience of aporia. Notwithstanding the pejorative disqualification of ‘mystical’, ‘mysticism’ or ‘esoteric’ that for instance philosophers like Jürgen Habermas elaborate to criticize Derrida’s philosophical enterprise, Derrida always has been very clear. In his article of 1967 on Bataille’s distinction between a restricted and general economy he defends Bataille against Sartre who called the author of \textit{L’Expérience intérieure} (1943) ‘a new mystic’. According to Derrida however, the latter envisaged a ‘conscious mystic’ beyond the opposition of rationalism and mysticism: “Ce qui, pour ébranler la sécurité du savoir discursif, s’indique comme mystique, renvoie au-delà de l’opposition du mystique et du rationnel”\footnote{L’écriture et la différence, o.c., p. 399.}. The same line of thought is applicable to the messianicity of the messianic in \textit{Religion}: this “cannot be contained in any traditional opposition, for example that between reason and mysticism”\footnote{See: Jürgen Habermas, \textit{Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne}. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a/M 1985, pp. 217. The final argument in the last sentence of Habermas’ article draws the conclusion that Derrida’s impotence to differentiate between literature and philosophy has led him into the worst thinkable philosophical position: an aporia.\footnote{Derrida and Negative Theology, o.c., p. 76.}}.\footnote{See: G.W.F. Hegel, \textit{Phénoménologie des Geistes}. Théorie Werkausgabe, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a/M 1970, pp. 547/572.}

The question raised in this context is whether this notion of ‘conscious mystic’ throws new light on Derrida’s deconstruction of Kant’s ‘reflecting faith’. The central theme for this comparison would be the death of God. Both Hegel and Nietzsche have proclaimed God’s death. Less known than Nietzsche is Hegel’s double proclamation of this famous death in \textit{Phénoménologie des Geistes}, speaking about “die offenbare Religion”\footnote{Derrida and Negative Theology, o.c., p. 74.}. For Bataille, Hegel and Nietzsche are the main sources of inspiration for developing his sacrificial philosophy, that stresses the experience of death in life - not unfamiliar to mysticism — as a result of transgressive practices in art practices and eroticism. But Derrida is more interested in Kant’s argumentation for the death of God as a precondition to a moral religion and a reflecting faith: “in order to conduct oneself in a moral manner, one must act as though
God did not exist or no longer concerned himself with our salvation. (...) act as though God had abandoned us"(11).

This performative aporia is the bond between ‘the death of God’ and ‘mystical’. In his essay on Benjamin’s ‘Kritik der Gewalt’ in Force of Law the ‘mystical foundation of authority’ as an mystical event also has a performative quality: the event itself is neither just nor unjust and – again this ‘virtualization’ – it is only knowable through its effects. As an epokhe or a differing ‘outside’ exoteric time, it is an originary violence that constitutes the law. The experience of justice in this originary sense is abyssal or aporetical. The law cannot be established referring to a transcendental signifier, nor to superhuman power. Its revealibility is not in need of revelation and beyond publicity. It points towards an immanence. Like difference this immanence ‘is’ not. It works: its ‘esse’ is the bonding or linking that engenders the social and the political.

Derrida - as Lyotard and Foucault - frequently uses the prefix ‘quasi’ in stressing the deconstructive quality of his conceptual tools. ‘Quasi’ indicates a splitting or a doubling: ‘différence as the difference of differences’, ‘the epokhe of the epoque’, ‘reduction of the reduction’ or ‘the signifier of the signifier’. ‘Quasi’ is an indication for the fact that the reflectivity of the ‘meta’ is already implied in an experience. In this kind of experience knowledge and faith coincide. The mystical foundation of the law is as ‘quasi’ transcendental as the “axiomatic performative that conditions and foreshadows ‘sincere’ declarations no less than lies and perjuries ...”(63).

‘Quasi’ deals with a non-discursive domain, a ‘non-lieu’ or atopos, an ‘empty place’ impossible to present, but through iterability yet constitutive for the signifying system through which this anteriority becomes discursively meaningful. In Deleuze’s reference to Bergson this might be called ‘the story-telling function’ (la fonction fabulatrice): “virtual instinct, creator of gods, inventor of religions, that is, of fictitious representations (représentations fictives) which will stand up to the representation of the real and which will succeed, by the intermediary of intelligence itself, in thwarting intellectual work”(26).

As difference the chora too is mystical. It is “the very place of an infinite resistance, of an infinitely impossible persistence”(21). Impossible to act upon – impassible – but nevertheless persisting and insisting in reality, the chora can be qualified as ‘virtual’: as with God there is “not a proof of the existence of (chora), but a proof of (chora) by (its) effects, (...) by effects without cause”(27). Chora is a

26 Bergsonism, a.c., p. 190.
27 Hent de Vries brings it up in another context: “Such an analysis (De Certeaus La fable mystique, HO), Derrida advances, could be termed "quasi-transcendental" or "quasi-ontological," formulations that do not signal any lack of rigor but, on the contrary, expose the narrative, fictional or, more precisely, fabulous features of the “mystical postu-
virtual reality. In this way we can understand Derrida’s circumscription of religion as “a resistance or a reaction to disjunction. To ab-solute alterity”(37). We cannot but connect and in connecting the Other dies. But ‘at the same time’ it has to respect this non-related alterity in order to be messianic. We have at the same time to distance ourselves: this experience is aporetical indeed.

The complexity of Derrida’s notion of ‘mystic’ becomes even greater when he connects the ‘mechanical repetition’ - so characteristic for the dynamics of the informational society with its machine like routines - with the ‘mystical’. A Deleuzean terminology is introduced: the ‘machinge’ as a force that detaches and reattaches to the home, the oikos, the familiar, in short to identity. But this mechanism too is a double bind: “at the same time it ex-propriates and re-appropriates”(42). ‘At the same time’ expresses the inevitability - impossibility and necessity - within the experience of the aporia.

3. Globalatization

How does religion return in ‘our’ globalizing world? What does this return mean now/here for ‘the everyman we believe we see’ and within ‘the whole of what is as it goes’(39)? Once we transpose all Derrida’s quasi-transcendental notions to the ‘real’ world of mediatepolitics, cd-rom, mobile phones, internet, multiculturalism and geo-political fundamentalism, the via negativa appears to be a via ‘negativa’: ICT subjects are all striving for full access to an exponentially accelerating and expanding Information Highway. Performativity is also the new dogma of the ‘tele-tecnoscientific’ matrix of a world that is governed by Information and Communication Technology (ICT): “a practical invention and a technical performativity is the very energy of its essence”(45). Bergson’s and Deleuze’s words are resonating in Derrida’s text when he starts talking about the tele-tecnoscientific performativity that consists of playing “with place, putting distances and speeds to work. It delocalizes, removes or brings close, actualizes or virtualizes, accelerates or decelerates” (45).

As in religion trustworthiness and credibility are presuppositions of capitalist rationality. Not only in financial transactions but especially in ‘mediamatic’ interactions: we are surrounded by technological media that nearly everyone take for granted, while not knowing how they work. ‘It’ works, that is all.(56) Accord-

"late" and thereby attempt to subtract it from the metaphysics of the - modern, subjective - will that would still haunt de Certeau’s analysis ...”. See: Hent de Vries, “Anti-Babel: The ‘Mystical Postulate’ in Benjamin, De Certeau and Derrida” in: Modern Language Notes, nr. 107, 1992, p. 449.
ing to Derrida tele-technoscientific capitalism presupposes faith, precisely because the ‘end-users’ lack know-how. Economic pragmatism - a tele-technoscientific legitimization through performativity - has become the legitimizing discourse of a reflecting faith that acknowledges the impossibility of a last foundation and the necessity to act as if everything works. Once the efficiency breaks down or apocalyptic scenario’s enter the international stage, this faith is put to the test.

a double binding: capitalism and religion

To Derrida religion and capitalism are interconnected as a result of a shared heritage. Not only is the rhetoric of the political tainted by the language of Rome - its juridical and theological institutions - the Roman-catholic Church legitimized the violent export of pretended universal, but factually ideological ideas over the globe. By now this globalized Latinization finds its apotheosis in the od-romanization of the Pope’s prayers. Globalization in the end is ‘globallatinization’(29/30): “a strange treaty between christianity as experience of the death of God and the tele-techno-scientific capitalism”(23). The heavenly eye becomes a ‘CNN-eye’(70), once the Foucauldian panopticum culminates in the mouse clicked, interfacial surveillance Deleuze talks about at the end of Pourparlers (1990)28. The double bind, characteristic for ‘marketfundamentalism’29, has already been analysed by Deleuze and Guattari in L’Anti-Oedipe. Capitalisme et schizophrénie (1972): they diagnosticize post-capitalism in terms of an immanent schizoid dynamics of decoding and recoding, deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

Where does in this world religion return? The last decade of the 20th century cyberspatialized wars kept the world in suspense. To Derrida those wars all are religious: not only because most of them are more or less religiously motivated, but because the fundamental categories of the political are still theologico-political.(25) What is offered to all religious groups - from small sectarian groups, tele-evangelists and fundamentalist terrorists to the great religions fighting for the hegemony of Jerusalem - is what Jeremy Rifkin in The Age of Access, The New Culture of Hypercapitalism where all of Life is a paid-for Experience (2000) sees as the precondition to contemporary autonomy in a tele-

technoscientific determined world: access for all. In having access to the world-market we are globally connected.

In doing this however religious groups expose themselves to a dispersion that is even bigger than the Diaspora. Tele-technoscience expropriates and delocalizes. This dispersion and fragmentation triggers two reactions that oscillate: the destruction of local communities and a counter-fetishism of the tele-technoscientific machinic: technological media and machines get a mystical quality. The religious reaction is also twofold: a reanimation of an authentic religious identity and a cosmopolitan, ecumenical and ecological protest. The problem of this last option is its hypocrisy: in criticizing the system one is aware of the inevitability to use the means and connection one is fighting against. Avoiding the psychological implication and stressing the philosophical inevitability I prefer to qualify this aporetical experience as 'hypocritical'.

Inevitability — in a de-historicized configuration: necessity and impossibility — is a constituent of this aporetical experience that is recognized to be the precondition of contemporary socio-political articulations of globalized interference. It perhaps takes its most dubious shape in Peacekeeping forces under guidance of the United Nations. Speaking of the New International in Spectres de Marx Derrida also has this experience as his last point of reference.

The 'spectre' or phantom of God is haunting the Global Village. Thinking a return of religion is related to the two sources of religion: trustworthiness and the unscathedness of the unscathed. Two kinds of performativity interfere: that of ICT and of the messianic. This tension is felt by religious groups making use of tele-technoscientific capitalism. Especially fundamentalism is haunted by a fear of the globalizing system it has to embrace to expand its message: "a reaction against that which it is partially linked: the dislocation, expropriation, delocalization, deracination, disidiomatization and dispossession (...) that the tele-technoscientific machine does not fail to produce". They are aware of its undermining potential as to the act of faith.

The claim on ethno-religious authenticity is xenophobic. Everything that differs, is violently excluded. In a less obvious phrasing: "what is at issue is indeed a persistent bond that bonds itself first and for most to itself". This tendency to self-protective auto-immunization, this self-'policing', in short: 'its own immunity' engenders the risk of 'radical evil'. To Kant this was an anthropological fact - the perversion of the human heart — that, notwithstanding its incomprehensi-

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31 To Slavoj Zizek, however, multiculturalism and fundamentalism join hands in a depoliticization of the global economy. See; "Multiculturalism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism" in: New Left Review, sept./oct. 1997.
sibility, reason had to take into account. To Derrida it stands for 'the final solution': all genocide from Auschwitz to Bosnia and Rwanda. He agrees with Kant that we cannot avoid this evil: the originary violence is beyond good and evil. In allying within the mechanical, machine-like, i.e. mystical iterability Faith engenders this risk of radical evil, sharing its fate with Knowledge: a disciplined destruction of the Other as the absolute alterity as took place in dehumanized cyber-spatialized wars, with the apex the telebombing of Baghdad. Every community that closes in on its own identity, every auto-immunization becomes self sacrificial, once the bond with the other, the future, freedom, in short with something that 'haunts' the system from within - 'a spectralizing messianicity' (51) - is lost.

Ethics has to take into account both sources of religion. Reflecting upon a 'return of religion' implies at the same time reflecting upon "a resistance or a reaction to disjunction". Derrida sees this 'internal splitting, which opens distance' (46) as the supplement of the auto-immunization. But this resistance only comes from within, if the aporia is the experience of religiosity: "It is there that the possibility of religion persists: the religious bond (scrupulous, respectful, modest, reticent, inhibited) between the value of life, its absolute 'dignity', and the theological machine, the 'machine for making gods'" (51). The reference to the Deleuzean Bergson is undeniable.

b. informe and infotom: ICTology

But what has ICT to do with chora of différence? In order to shed more light on the context of both resistance and distance in terms of our Information Age, I find it useful to develop Derrida's line of thought in less Derridean terms. It is not just a replacement I aim at. In introducing two neologisms I hope to elucidate in a less 'sublime' manner the relation of the ICT, religion and everyday consciousness. Like Derrida does in relating to Heidegger's text, I limit myself "to situating a principle of reading" (61) of Religion. The first neologism is the 'degré zéro' of knowledge and faith within ICT: the 'infotom'. The second its resisting supplement: 'informe'. Both are notions that can be used to analyse the mystical dimension of ICT. In that sense I present a perspective that can be labeled as 'ICTological'.

Informatization can be understood as a twofold process: it produces information in order to form informational subjects, suited to function in a world that orients itself within the spatial tensions between local and global and the temporal tensions between actual and virtual. 32 Foucault's analyses of subjectivity offer an

32 Of course, we can rescribe this in terms of différence: "to temporize, to take recourse, consciously or unconsciously, in the temporal and temporizing mediation of
analogy. In defining the dynamics between knowledge and power as a practice wherein subjectivity is produced, Foucault has opened our eyes for the ‘corporeality’ of knowledge and the intricate relation between repressive and productive power. In disciplining practices – the nuclear family, school, prison, clinic – resistance is triggered as an unavoidable ‘restance’: undisciplined forces are produced at the same time that bodies are disciplined in pedagogical, educative, therapeutic and penal practices, legitimized by human sciences. In producing its own resistance powerformations can strengthen themselves. Still Foucault does not agree with Marcuse’s concept of ‘repressive tolerance’: there is always a surplus that cannot be disciplined, because there is no focal point of Resistance.

Marx’s fetish thesis from The Capital returns in Georg Lukacs’ thesis on the reification of social relations. Nowadays it is plausible to speak of a radical informatization of socio-political relations: within a ICTological perspective globalized subjects only come into existence when they are informed in a twofold sense. But as in Foucault’s diagnostics of disciplining power in the process of informatization - informing and forming - not yet (in)formed forces are produced as a supplement. I qualify these as formless or ‘informe’. This informe is the desacralized version of Derrida’s chora: that in which the forms take (their) place, but is itself formless, but is – as Derrida adds - nevertheless not beyond being. As chora, informe persists, insists and resists. It might even be philosophically fruitful to transfer this ‘notion’ to what Derrida calls the unscathed (indemne) as far as this is at the same time a supplement of informatization. In other words: informe is an the outside in and beyond this opposition, constitutive for this very opposition. In ICTological terms I have a better understanding of what Derrida is talking about when he says that ‘resistance’ comes from within. Informe is “the very unviability of the visibility” (27), “the desert in the desert”, “the unengenderable thus engendered”, ‘the empty place’. It is the immanence of resistance

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33 I use a notion that Bataille introduced as a short item in his ‘Dictionnaire’, published in Documents (1929).

34 Foucault used this same deconstructive formulation. Foucault’s “à faire voir combien est invisible l’invisibilité du visible” in “La pensée du dehors” (Dit et écrits I (1994), p. 524.
within the Informational Society. To me both chora and informe denote “the indecisive oscillation (...) between revelation and revealibility, between event and possibility or virtuality of the event”, while at the same time they ‘are’ ”the very place of infinite resistance”. The informe however is as less calculable as it is predictable. To make it calculable it has to be informed. Did modern subjectivity presuppose human sciences and disciplining practices, accessible subjects presuppose informatics, neurobiology, neurophysiology, biogenetics, astrophysics and ICT practices.

Reality — the political, economic and social real — has become infotomic. From an ICTologistic point of view the constructive units of the universe are no longer atoms, but infotoms. Infotoms are not facts, they are data. Relativity theory traced forces on a sub-atomic level by accelerating processes: a quantum is at the same time a particle and a wave. These data can only be seen on interfaces: infotoms. As a result of this interfacial anticipation these data are always already linked to the process of informatization. Infotoms have no substantial existence outside the domain of informatization. For some euphoric scientists like Hans Moravic Man is nothing but an infotomic being: after downloading consciousness and uploading it in a new medium his body can be cast away.

Even God has become an infotomic being. Nobody has ‘proven’ this hardly imaginable idea more extensive than the mathematician Frank Tipler. In The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead (1996) Tipler’s mathematically arguments for omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence of Man in the univers. Theological notions are rephrased in terms of informatization. The completed informatization of the univers — a process that began with the Pathfinder and Explorer — makes resurrection, immortality and God like ‘experiences’ real options in the future. For ICTologian Tipler, a former atheist, God has returned in ICT.

In Tipler’s ICTology there is no place for the informe, nor for resistance. ICTology is a completely closed system: solely a ‘real’ machine for making gods. On this point we have to return to Derrida for rephrasing the experience of the informe. Derrida is trying to think “the interconnectedness, albeit otherwise, of knowledge and faith, technoscience and religious belief, calculation and the sac-

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35 Infotoms are also the ‘substance’ of risk analyses that are used by insurance companies. As statistical data they present the informe as an ultimate risk of global expansion within a risk society. When we translate this to Derrida talking about ‘risk of radical evil’ in the informational society this is no longer exclusively a man caused genocide, but also man caused millennium bugs, civil nuclear meltdowns, global warming and mad cow disease. See: Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Sage, Lonen 1992; The Politics of Risk Society. Jane Franklin (ed.) Polity Press, Oxford 1998.
ro sanct”(54). Encrypting the source of both Faith and Knowledge Derrida thematizes an aporia that has the experiential quality of the informe: as an infotom the informe is haunted by informatization, but it is resisting this at the same time: “the chance of this desert in the desert (…) is that in uprooting the tradition that bears it, in atheologizing it, this abstraction, without denying faith, liberates a universal rationality and the political democracy that cannot be dissociated from it”(19). When we situate Derrida’s thesis of the ambiguousness and ambivalence of the ‘religious’ experience against his claim that this impossible experience must be understood within an ‘everyday’ context - the mystic of the mechanical - and of ‘the whole of what is as it goes’(39), a simple question arises: How to ‘be’ religious or mystical in a ‘mediacracy’, in a world ruled by technological media, avoiding a violent exclusivity or total defragmentation? In experiential terms: how to stay, within tele-technoscientific capitalism, open to or even affirm the aporetical tensions, ‘caused’ by the informe?

5. Inter-esse: ontology of the in between

For Kant abandoning God is a precondition for a moral lifestyle, opposed to dogmatic belief that neglects the tension between knowing and believing. I do not think one exemplary lifestyle is still available. Nevertheless the immanence of a life can be that intensive that one cannot escape to be influenced by certain forms of life. Derrida focuses on “the consequence here in this world, in experience, of this abandonment”(11/12). He poses the crucial question for thinking the return of religion: is moral calling and morality for Christianity only possible – and the following phrase will be crucial to Derrida – “if it endures in this world, in phenomenological history, the death of God …?”(12). Transposed to our world Derrida aims at “another ‘tolerance’ (which) would be in accord with the experience of the ‘desert in the desert’, respecting the distance of infinite alterity as singularity”.

As the informe, singularity is neither fact, nor data. It resists being informed. It is the ‘datum’ as Derrida calls it in Schibboleth. Because a singularity cannot be known, it cannot be understood by neurophysiology, biogenetics and astrophysics, although in its infotomic articulation it is produced by their informative and performative power. As a singularity the informe is what Derrida, in deconstructing Heidegger’s opposition of ‘Seinsdenken’ and Faith, calls a ‘Faktum’: “the vague and ordinary pre-comprehension of the meaning of being, and first and for all of the words ‘is’ or ‘be’ in language or in a language (§2). The Faktum is not an empirical fact. Each time Heidegger uses this word we are led back to a zone where acquiescence is de rigueur”.(62)
In deconstructing ‘religio’ Derrida from the beginning of this enterprise was aware of the fact that “it would have been madness itself to have proposed to treat religion itself, in general or in its essence”(38). In singularizing ‘religio’ he presents aporetical experiences finally as ‘Faktum’, i.e. a zone. In Sein und Zeit Heidegger specifies this zone as ‘Dasein’. But once we relate this ‘zone’ to ‘Mitslein’ as Derrida suggests — “the already common experience of a language and of a ‘we’ for which Dasein is an exemplary witness”(61) — we can qualify with Heidegger Dasein as a being of a ‘Zwischen’. This zone becomes a more familiar place, recognizable in Derrida’s exploration of the religious: chora.

In ICTology Dasein is reduced to Design: it has become a reproducible, eventually a hyperindividualized, but commonly shared lifestyle, as Gilmore and Pine describe in The Experience Economy (1998). In keeping Dasein informed, via its accessibility it is linked instantly to other Dasein. This, however, is not the Mitslein Derrida is talking about: although ‘religio’ is the “link of repetition to itself”, a linking without any informe or resistance would be self sacrificial. To Derrida there must be an openness to “something other and more than itself”(51) in order to “respect the distance of infinite alterity as singularity”(22). What is respected, however, is neither an ‘object’ nor a infinite alterity. What is respected is ‘distance’: like the pledge – gage – presupposes a non-explicable authority, we don’t know what is at the other end of this engagement. Intentionality transforms into respect in Mitslein. What is needed is: “respect, modesty, restraint, inhibition, Achtung (Kant), Scheu, Verhaltenheit, Gelassenheit (Heidegger), restraint or holding-back <halte> in general”(49).

This attitude does not imply total abstinance or an ascetic retreat. It demands what in Aporias is called a ‘non-passive endurance’ and in Religion ‘new’ tolerance. In a very quick turn Derrida connects tolerance with respect. Perhaps because of the ‘ance’, in which connotations with différance resonate: it conditions a spacing. Nevertheless tolerance is a hierarchical notion: it presupposes minorities.36 It does not respect their resistance. Perhaps that is why Derrida puts ‘tolerance’ between quotation marks. In extracting it from its Christian origins he envisages “another ‘tolerance’ (that) would be in accord with the experience of the ‘desert in the desert’”(22). Again, it might be more adequate to understand it as non-passive endurance. Only by presupposing ‘endurance’ can Derrida connect tolerance with respect.

“Respect for this singular indecision [...] between two originarities”(49). ‘Between’ is the key word here. My problem with Derrida deconstructing metaphysics is his ‘fixation’ on oppositions and a ‘fixation’ on a deconstructed outside. In his notion of chora I still hear the negative and hierarchical overtones, he criticizes in Levinas. This does not imply that Derrida is a crypto-metaphysician, but his proposal to understand the Kantian notion ‘reflecting faith’ for ‘everyday man’ still has a sublime quality. Perhaps the return of religion is less ‘religious’ than Derrida thinks. Being not able to elaborate the affirmative quality of the experience of the ‘in between’, he keeps talking about non-relation and distance. The ‘in between’ does not result form relating two positions. Heidegger explicitly warned his readers not to make the mistake in understanding the ‘Zwischen’ as “the result of the convenientia of two beings that are given”³⁷. But the still metaphysical overtones of the differential tension between the ontic and the ontological, between the existential on the existence and - last but not least - between the authentic and the inauthentic – Eigentlichkeit – obscure the ‘ontological primacy’ of the in between that thinkers of differences are aiming at. Even in the configuration ‘Enteignen/Ereignis’ he fails to grasp the originarity of the in between, notwithstanding his remark in “Was heisst Denken?”: “Interesse heißt: unter und zwischen den Sachen sein, mitten in einer Sache stehen und bei ihr ausharren”³⁸.

Both Deleuze and Derrida criticize Heidegger’s ontological difference by stressing the in between. ‘Différence’ as spacing is “neither simply active nor simply passive, announcing or rather recalling something like the middle voice, saying an operation that is not an operation, an operation that cannot be conceived either as passion or as the action of a subject on an object, or on the basis of the categories of agent or patient, neither on the basis of, nor moving towards any of these terms”.³⁹ The implied reflectivity is instructive: to announce or to recall both are reflective temporal stances towards an event. This event as the core of an experiential aporia could be the middle voice or ‘intermediary’.

In affirming the productive and affirmative forces of the in between Deleuze and Guattari ‘fine tune’ Derrida’s middle voice and overcome distances without identifying the object at the end of the trajectory. For them the in between is all their is as a ‘mi-lieu’. In the final sentence of their introduction ‘Rhizome’ to Mille Plateaux (1980) Deleuze and Guattari characterize the middle slightly different from Derrida, but we can hear Derrida’s remarks in Religion resonating:

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³⁷ Heidegger 1998, 177
³⁹ Marge, oc. p.9.
"The middle (milieu) is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up speed. Between (entre) things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle". 40 This ‘inter’ ‘exists’ ‘before’ any position, although we can only describe this ‘before’ afterwards. The quotation marks indicate that in order to circumscribe the in between, a discursive explanation focused on presence, representation and linear time grossly fails. 41

b. local inter-esse: being in between and immanence

No (op)positions, but linking. No space, but spacing. No possibility, but virtuality. The ‘between’ of revelation and revealability, of the event and possibility or virtuality of the event is ‘religio’ if, as a ‘link of repetition to itself, it ‘is’ at the same time ‘the threshold of every social or communitarian link’ (22). When Derrida speaks of a hauntology, in an ICTological perspective, it is the informe that haunts the informatization that haunts the informe. If ‘ontology’ is still an option, then only as an ontology of the in between: an esse of the inter. ICTology can only escape its auto-immunization in allowing informe within informatization and local inter-esse. I don’t think Derridean respect and self sacrifice suffice to secure the in between. That is why I invite Derrida to become more Deleuzean. The easiest way out is to say that mutual respect is not the same as doubling the distance. Mutual respect engenders the in between. But it is not that easy to link Deleuze with Derrida. In spite of— or perhaps even— because of— his infinite deconstruction of the ab-solute alterity Derrida is still focused on autonomy and sovereignty, be it ex negativo. In Deleuze’s philosophy the key word is immanence. The linking is already given when he starts philosophying: he affirms the multiplicity and connectivity without searching for a legitimization.


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In his last text “L’immanence: une vie ...” Deleuze qualifies immanence as a life. Not of a life or in a life. There is no transcendence. A life is not the biography of an autonomous subject: it is the articulation of it as a ‘plan d’immanence’. The subject’s coherence is not dependent upon its will or intentions. It is created in ‘entre-temps’ and ‘entre-moments’: “Une vie ne contient que des virtuels. Elle est faite de virtualités, événements, singularités”42. We all know what the secret is Derrida is looking for in order to overcome the distance and find common ground for both chora and immanence: the secret is that there is no secret at all.

42 Philosophie, o.c., p. 6.