MOVED BY APPEARANCE
Towards a hypercritique of xenophobic
reason
The complex relations between
three lines of thought are indicated by the title and the subtitle
of this dissertation: Moved by appearances. Towards a hypercritique
of xenophobic reason. A wide spread phenomenon is treated seriously:
the modern individual's behaviour is deeply influenced by appearance,
varying from the remnants of utopian imagination via the temptations
of a spectacle and consumer society, to computer simulations. Being
affected by these appearances however implies more than a merely mechanical
manner of behavior according to the laws of a market economy or of
biological survival. An epistemological reflection of being moved
by appearances leads on the one hand to a radical critique of western
metaphysics as a specific way of thinking: identifying and totalizing.
On the other hand this reflection can be an inspiration for an ethicopolitical
attitude: what historically was excluded, is not only tolerated, but
moreover respected for its irreducible heterogenity.
The connection of an ethical
attitude to epistemological reflections is further accompagnied by
an aesthetically orientated view. This threefold approach throws a
light on recent cooperations between artists and philosophers which
are different from the usual conceptions. Our approach is not only
an indication of a different position within philosophy, but it could
also be indicative of another way of philosophizing. Although the
predicate 'aesthetical' for this kind of philosophizing suggests at
the first sight that it will be deprived of any practical implications,
we will argue that such an aestheticization of thinking has positive
implications in the ethicopolitical domain. In cultivating a specific
sensibility of the Other and of Difference it parallels modernist
art practice.
1 The structure of the debate and the
position of its participants
The text consists of three
parts. First of all, in the six chapters in Part 1 the works of Friedrich
Nietzsche will be discussed. The main subject of this discussion is
his critical reading of Plato's opposition between appearance and
being. That there is an ambiguity about the crucial role of aesthetics
(epistemologically expressed by tracing the concept to the metaphor),
which is the result of a critical Nietzsche reading, is the starting
point of an analysis of his work from the perspective of a sensiblity
of the Other and the Different.
The thesis that aporetical,
selfundermining writing and speaking are the epistemological implications
of this aestheticization will be developed both systematically and
historically. Provisionally the conclusion of Part 1 is as follows:
Nietzsche does not invert the opposition appearance being (and by
implication a series of other oppositions), but he situates it against
the ground of an ineffable experience of existence. This experience,
expressed in 'abyss thoughts' like the Will to Power, The Eternal
Recurrence and the Übermensch, animates Nietzsche's discourse
which is nonetheless a discursive one. A specific pathos suffering
and passion keeps Nietzsche's 'linguistic feints' moving.
As Nietzsche has never expressed
himself systematically and in epistemological terms about the opposition
of appearance and being, extensive excursions are inserted into Part
1, in which this problem is analysed as it appears in the writings
of Kant and Hegel, especially in respectively Kritik der reinen
Vernunft/Kritik der Urteilskraft and Phänomenologie des
Geistes/Wissenschaft der Logik. Moreover, those 'excursions' are
inserted with regard to their importance as a contraposition to the
Nietzschean orientated thinkers of difference: Michel Foucault, Gilles
Deleuze, Jean François Lyotard and Jacques Derrida. Their writings
are the subject matter of the following chapters of this thesis. The
issue is the following: all of their philosophical efforts, all of
these 'essays' in a literal sense, have in common that they can no
longer rationally legitimize their philosophical discourse, for they
are using a notion of truth that they at the same time destroy in
their own text.
The work of those thinkers
is the main subject in Part 2 and 3. The mutual congeniality between
their texts consists of the critical thought that western philosophy
was never able to conceive of the Other or of Difference without ultimately
subordinating it to an identity, to a law or to a generality. In their
critiques, these thinkers of difference or to put it more precisely:
of differences define the abovementioned crucial activity of occidental
reasoning as identifying and totalizing. In their radical writings,
which have been published since the early sixties, they open up, each
in his own way, a discursive space in which the Other or Difference
can be lit up. "To light up" is probably the most subtle metaphor
by which differences can be expressed without losing their specifity,
uniqueness and ephemeral quality. Because by definition the unique
contains something that is inconceivable, its experience often involves
a certain bewilderment. That this bewilderment can be experienced
as threatening in an identity orientated culture is one of the ideas
that, in a critical sense, constitutes the ethicopolitical quality
of their philosophy.
In retrospect it is not surprising
that the thinkers of differences were inspired by the works of Friedrich
Nietzsche. After all, Nietzsche, in pushing western metaphysics to
its limits, opens our eyes to its aesthetical and physiological foundations:
thinking is continuously traversed by images and affects. However,
the ambiguous elaboration of this aesthetical insight leads to different
evaluations of Nietzsche's critique: for some he is the last metaphysical
thinker, for others precisely the opposite, i.e. the first thinker
who goes beyond metaphysics. In order to clarify my own position in
this debate several critics and opponents of Nietzsche are considered.
Here again my decision to put them on stage is inspired by the idea
that these critics of Nietzsche have nevertheless had a determining
impact on the thinkers of differences.
A thoroughly systematic and
historical analysis of the Nietzschean inspiration also clarifies
one of the reasons for the recent Kant revival in the writings of
thinkers of differences. Kant's issue of the sublime underpins Nietzsche's
aesthetically orientated critique of western civilization. The tension
between pleasure and pain, specific for the experience of the sublime,
is incorporated by Nietzsche into his earliest work in the dichotomy
Dionysian Apollonian. However, in Nietzsche's early writings the tension
between them is never resolved as with Kant in order to strengthen
subjectivity. Rereading Kant by thinkers of differences from a Nietzschean
perspective might well have been animated by the need to broaden the
apparently amoral Nietzschean position in an ethicopolitical manner.
By connecting Nietzsche to Kant the relations between epistemology,
aesthetics and ethics are being reassessed.
Another modern thinker who
is indispensable to a systematic understanding of the revival of interest
in Kantian aesthetics is Hegel. The critique from thinkers of differences
of the Hegelian dialectical line of thought, which is the model of
identifying and totalizing thinking, concerns most of all his systematically
founded reduction of difference to identity. As is worked out in the
writings of Theodor W. Adorno, the critique of Hegelian dialectics
in the later work of thinkers of differences gravitates towards a
rereading of Kant from a Nietzschean perspective. For the first time
since Kant and Hegel, Adorno raises the question of the relation between
philosophy and aesthetics in a penetrating way. He sheds new light
on philosophy's relation to art. With the occasional exception of
Lyotard, thinkers of differences elaborate the analogous relation
between philosophy and art, without referring to the work of Adorno
or other members of the Frankfurt School. Two of them Foucault and
Derrida have themselves explicitly been guided by the thoughts of
Georges Bataille. In his oeuvre he is also inspired by Nietzsche discursive
thinking, from a retrospective point of view, is always limited by
a disruptive experience that can never be fully understood. Both,
Adorno and Bataille, still remain connected to the Hegelian model.
Thinkers of differences in the end go beyond dialectics; they also
distinguish themselves from Adorno and Bataille by an insight into
the constitutive value of language for consciousness. Nietzsche's
insight into the grammatical temptation to metaphysics is here being
rephrased in an actual way. I set out to show that this variant of
the `linguistic turn' persists in thinkers of differences in notions
such as textuality, discourse, truth games and
writing (écriture).
In the philosophy of differences,
time and again a nonconceptual, nondiscursive dimension appears to
play a decisive role in thinking. This makes thinking vulnerable:
a final foundation proves to be impossible. Thinking is deprived of
the last word. It is this insight that is severely criticized by Jürgen
Habermas. His reproach, directed at thinkers of differences, that
their way of philosophizing leads to all kinds of aporias, is considered
seriously. It is my appraisal of this aporetical refutation of all
kinds of 'foundation' or in other terms, this abyss quality that makes
Habermas my main opponent, since his valuations of the same data are
diametrically opposed to those explicated in this thesis. In the works
of thinkers of differences and their sources of inspiration (one could
mention Nietzsche, Heidegger, Bataille and Adorno), Habermas argues,
philosophy is no longer able to reflect on ethical and political issues.
This philosophy has blurred the opposition between rhetoric and logic.
In spite of this almost indestructible prejudice, however, it is my
opinion that these thinkers not only have succeeded in their efforts
to reformulate ethical and political issues, but they also force us
to deal with contemporary social and political dilemmas from a different
perspective.
Although Habermas criticizes
the implications of the philosophy of Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard and
Derrida as being aporetic, it is obvious that their philosophy remains
within the discursive practice. This becomes even more evident, once
we take a close look at 'the philosopher of indifference', Jean Baudrillard.
He argues that thinkers of differences still seem to be preoccupied
by modernist views on ontology and epistemology. Therefore, it seems
a legitimate option to situate them between Habermas' and Baudrillard's
position. It then becomes clear that their texts can no longer be
trivialized as mere literature, nor reduced to strictly discursive
practices. Moreover, a specific analysis of Baudrillard's writings
enables us to pinpoint the ethical and political content of their
oeuvre more thoroughly.
By questioning the identifying
and totalizing impact of western philosophy, that is, by opening our
minds to irreducible differences, thinkers of differences have tried
to show us that not only the Difference, but the Other as well, are
indispensable to any kind of identity or community. Their insights
focus precisely on the phenomenon of the Other as the Xenos (Stranger)
that has always been destroyed, banned or superseded by western civilisation.
A systematic reflection on the foundations of these identifying and
totalizing tendencies must therefore result in a philosophy that turns
against itself once it tries to reveal the 'essence' of the Xenos:
it has to criticize the roots of its own xenophobic structures. We
are no longer methodologically able to define this kind of selfreflection
as a critique in the Kantian sense, since this 'critique' is determined
to annihilate its own basis. That is the reason for calling this effort
a hypercritique of xenophobic reason: the genitive 'of'
has to be understood both in an objective and a subjective sense.
In short, Part 1 focuses on
the oeuvre of Nietzsche and the philosophical relationship with Kant
and Hegel in order to evaluate a philosophy of differences.
In Part 2, the texts and the main issue of thinkers of differences
will be discussed. To give a more precise indication of their scope,
several texts by Bataille and Adorno are analysed in excursions, whereas
a separate chapter has been devoted to the criticism of Habermas.
While the discussion in the
first two parts has a primarily critical character, the relation to
art in the third part is explicated in an affirmative way. For that
purpose chapter 11 refers to a few important art theoretical and art
critical discussions against the ground of the thinking of differences.
The artist Kosuth, the critic Greenberg, theorists of art and aestheticians
such as Jauss, Danto, De Duve and Welsch participate in these debates.
This approach sheds light on the specific nature of the aestheticization
that takes place in a philosophy of differences. By referring to the
Nietzschean pathos dealt with in Part 1, Baudrillard's critique is
called upon in the last sections of chapter 12 in order to neutralize
the ethicopolitical sterility which the qualification 'aesthetical'
adheres. In conclusion, in chapter 13, this being moved, this
combination of suffering and passion, of pain and pleasure, is the
starting point for tracing the ethicopolitical impact of the philosophies
of these thinkers of differences.
2 Thematic outlines
From my perspective of Otherness,
thinking of Difference (in both senses of 'distinction' and 'dispute')
circles thematically around a few philosophical problems which articulate
themselves on different levels within philosophical systematics: from
the ontological through the epistemological to the aesthetical level.
As a result, ethicopolitical implications can be derived. These are
problems which have haunted philosophy since Plato. They are closely
related to each other: the problem of appearance being (ontology),
the sterilizing impact of aporias on truth (epistemology), the ambiguity
of philosophy's relationship to art (aesthetics) and the consequences
for both individual and collective behavior (ethics and politics).
The analyses of the issues
of appearance, aporias and a specific aesthetical experience within
and of thinking form the framework of my argumentation. The three
notions, which in the history of western thought have all become pejoratives,
are transformed in such a way, that their negative connotations disappear
without losing the tension.
2.1 Appearance
In Part 1, a discussion is
staged about the status of appearance as treated in the works of,
on one side, Nietzsche and on the other, Kant and Hegel. With his
search for the essence of the truth of Being, which is hidden behind
the world of the senses, Plato has opened occidental thought to the
realm of metaphysics. Plato detested the Sophists who, in his opinion,
ridiculized the truth by canonizing all sorts of linguistic paradoxes
in order to affirm the appearance of the visible world. Given the
priority of the Forms, and by means of splitting up or dichotomizing
reality, philosophical thought is understood as metaphysics. This
tonality still resonates in Descartes' "cogito ergo sum". In Descartes'
philosophy, however, God is still the theological guarantor of a correspondence
between consciousness and extension, between thinking and matter.
With his critique on metaphysics,
Kant in an epistemological sense negates God as the guarantor of knowledge:
"cogito ergo sum" separates and falls apart. It is only through the
mediating function of his aesthetical judgement that he can connect
knowing and willing. By means of this he is able to furnish a solution
for the antinomies within reason. In spite of the epistemological
dualism, language is for Kant philosophically relevant only as a bearer
of discursive judgments. As such it is a transparent medium, that
materializes the categories of reason. And although Hegel treats language
as an anthropological and aesthetic phenomenon it plays an important
role in his programmatic considerations in his formal ontological
analysis language is by no means analysed as a constitutive moment
for knowledge. Criticizing Kant's dualism, he attempts to reconcile
thinking and being ('cogito' and 'sum') by considering reality and
reason as coincident: the endless selfreflective movement of the Spirit.
From his dialectical perspective contradiction as a transformed antinomy
motivates thinking, but eventually is reconciled. By that means metaphysics
as 'Formalontologie' finally reaches its most exhaustive, but also
most exhausted figuration.
Nietzsche's revaluation of
the opposition between appearance and being has repercussions for
the central epistemological Kantian and Hegelian notions, respectively
for the antinomies and the contradiction. While Kant and Hegel are
still trying to find a systematic solution to these problems, Nietzsche
promotes them to the core of his philosophy. For Nietzsche the foundation
of reality is contradiction, or, from an aesthetical angle, a dissonance
that can never be resolved.
2.2 Aporias
For Nietzsche the problem
of appearance culminates in aporetical philosophizing. In my opinion
an epistemological undermining is at the basis of the works of thinkers
of differences. The revaluation of this aporetical tension is the
central theme in Part 2. This selfundermining tension arises from
its own understanding of its inability to grasp oneself and to grasp
reality. Non discursive forces are always playing a part. As a result
aporias appear to be more than strictly epistemological figures. By
enduring this aporetical tension, reality can be experienced aesthetically.
In the case of Nietzsche this experience triggers the insight that
a physiological orientation and all encompassing imagination are necessary
in order to complete the concept.
This by no means implies that
thinking aims at aporia as a goal in itself. It is ultimately an unfruitful
thought, that thinking could consciously intend an aporia, i.e. it's
own decline. Even if a certain inclination to 'thanatos' is not foreign
to thinking, and although, given its identifying and totalizing effects,
it tends to leveling or equalizing and sometimes even to indifference,
the observation that thinking is aporetical seems to be the ultimate
limit. Tracing a constitutive aporetical tension in thinking implies
a deprivation of the last word. Facing an uncomprehensible experience,
it imposes a temporary silence upon itself. What remains is nevertheless
not a breathless stammering. Speaking has an equivocal relation towards
the phenomenon it wishes to speak about. Speaking implies oscillating
between evocations of an experience which cannot be articulated discursively
and a deliberate restraint in discursive formulations.
2.3 Aesthetic experience
In Part 3, this aporetical
philosophizing is related to the context of current art critical discourses.
The qualification 'aesthetical' has a pejorative connotation simular
to 'aporetical' in philosophical discussions. Many philosophers consider
the aporia a sterilizing figure, which expresses the impotence of
the subject to legitimize itself in its claims of knowledge: aporias
are considered a deadend street, or a 'cul-de-sac', of western philosophy.
In contemporary art discourses the notion 'aesthetical' in its turn
gains the connotation of a sterile, external processing, which is
considered more important than the content. 'Aesthetical' connotates
pure formality and superfluous decoration lacking substance. Even
in the avantgarde imperative of the autonomy of the art work with
its dynamics of form, color and movement, form is still understood
as an expression of an idea. From a position developed primarily by
thinkers of differences, I revaluate the qualification 'aesthetical',
in a process which is analogous to the discussion of appearance and
aporias.
As a result of a new selfdefinition
of thought, a new position of the decentralized subject presents itself
in the 'postmodern' condition. Selfconscious of its inadequacy to
encompass reality, the selfconsciousness or the subject positions
itself within an event. This gives thinking a new tonality.
Affective and sensory experience, i.e. sensuality, is inseparably
connected to conceptual mediation. In the light of this new selfdefinition,
an aporia turns out to be more than a logical figure: it is a conceptual
form of an experience of an abyss. Shifting from a logical figure
to this appalling experience, the notion of aporia is linked to the
qualification 'aesthetical': philosophy acquires an aesthetical quality,
it becomes an aesthetical experience. As soon as the selfconsciousness
depletes itself in aporetical philosophizing it acquires an aesthetical
quality. However, the awareness of philosophers of the aesthetical
and creative qualities of thinking is not a recent phenomenon: it
is the outcome of crucial developments within modern philosophy since
Kant. This is yet another reason for the recent interest in Kant's
aesthetics.
3 The trial of thought
Time and again the diagnostical
analyses of Nietzsche and the thinkers of difference are reproached
for being immoral and of having developed a philosophy that, from
an ethicopolitical perspective, is a deadend. But this seems to be
an inevitable aspect of an abstract work of art: real insight is only
established once the dynamics of the work are physically experienced.
Philosophy becomes an activity, a process that, as if the metaphysical
intention were being parodied, produces and destroys its own foundations.
No wonder that the critics of this way of philosophizing justifiably
and continuously point out the aporetical, selfundermining impact.
However, it usually escapes the notice of the same critics that this
is exactly the crucial point thinkers of difference are trying to
make. Being aware of the impossibility of producing universal truths
or guidelines for collective behavior, they are conscious of the ultimate
incomprehensibility, of the abyss dimension of their own discourse.
All of their philosophical efforts, all of these 'essays' in a literal
sense, have in common that they can no longer rationally legitimize
their philosophical discourse, for they have ultimately an ambiguous
relation to truth.
In this thesis, thinking is
put to the test: how radically does philosophy dare to criticize itself?
The new understanding that is the consequence of this trial is, to
be sure, not a necessary implication, no more than a matter of taste.
An attempt is made to demonstrate that what is strictly speaking artificial
quality of the philosophies of thinkers of difference is selfconsious
in being positively moved by appearances: this commotion implies an
ethicopolitical (under)standing.
In spite of the radical critique
of the notion of truth the inheritance of Nietzsche they philosophize,
just as did the sophists in the time of Plato, starting with the paradox
of the necessity and the impossibility of speaking truth. They manoeuvre
within appearances, produce feints with which they dodge past the
scholar eager for truth. In order to play their language games they
execute a style of writing, by means of which the objectified phenomenon
is evoked at the same time as an appalling experience: Bataille describes
dissipation by objectifying and activating it in his texts. This is
true to the same extent for Foucault's notion of power, Derrida's
'différance', Deleuze's rhizomatic and Lyotard's deregulatory
thinking. Thinking becomes an ordeal as well as a disquieting experience
that cannot but move and disturb the reader.
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